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Educational Opportunities and 
Geographical Distribution of Degree Teachers 
in Saskatchewan 
P.Y. Walmsley 
and 
M. Ohtsu 
The purpose of this study is to examine the historical trend 
on the distribution of teacher skillmix between 1957 and 1974 in 
the light of certain changes in the socio-economic setting surroun-
ding employment of teachers which occured during the period. 
Equalization of educational opportunity throughout the province is a 
stated policy of the Government of Saskatchewan as it is of most political 
jurisdictions in North America. The quality of the educational services pro-
vided will be affected by many component factors such as library holdings, 
physical facilities and equipment, the curriculum, and abilities of educa-
tional administrators. However, given the nature of the educational process 
it would seem not unreasonable to believe that teacher skill may well be the 
single most important factor in determining the quality of educational ex-
périence that the children in the System will receive. 
In an earlier study, the authors pointed out that even with the adoption 
of a single province-wide wage scale, "individual school boards are able to 
manage a skill-mix in such a way as to perpetuate a disequitable level of 
teaching skills"1. In essence, each local school board retains the authority 
and administrative discrétion to détermine the numbers of teachers in each 
skill class to staff the System. This finding has been obtained out of the 
analysis of cross-sectional data for 1970, 1971, and 1972. It became our in-
tention, then, to investigate the historical trend in teacher skill-mix distribu-
tion. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to examine the historical trend 
in the distribution of teacher skill-mix between 1957 and 1974 in the light of 
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certain changes in the socio-economic setting surrounding employment of 
teachers which occurred during the period. 
The measure of teacher skill-mix used in this study is the degree teacher 
ratio in a local school board, that is, the number of teachers with at least 
four years of post secondary éducation expressed as a percentage of the 
total number of teachers employed by the board. In Saskatchewan teacher 
qualifications are assigned within a six class System, a university four year 
baccalaureate degree in éducation being the required standard for Class IV 
désignation. Needless to say, the degree teacher ratio is not a perfect proxy 
of teacher skill-mix. There is little doubt that such factors as expérience, in-
nate ability and motivation affect actual teaching performance. Even so, 
the use of the percentage of degree teachers as a proxy of skill-mix is not an 
unreasonable choice. 
In the fairly distant past it was generally true that the two-year Class II 
teaching certificate, as a minimum, was considered acceptable elementary 
school teaching and the university degree was preferred for secondary 
school teaching. This distinction is not now formally made and degree 
teachers are employed at ail educational levels, though it is generally ac-
cepted by most people in the field that a four-year course constitutes a "bet-
ter" rather than merely a "différent" program of professional instruction. 
It is by no means universally accepted that the System would be better if ail 
teachers were university graduâtes. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted 
that the total provincial educational system, the System at the school board 
level, and the individual school, is better served as the ratio of four-year 
teachers increases toward some optimal level that is above the présent ratio 
for the system as a whole and probably for most sub-units within the 
system. 
As will be observed shortly, geographical differentials in the degree 
teacher ratio among différent school boards hâve narrowed steadily during 
the period of observation. Before formulating any hypothesis to explain this 
trend, we will first discuss the changes in the socio-economic setting which 
took place during the period. 
CHANGES IN THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SETTING 
Changes in the socio-economic setting, which seem relevant to the 
distribution of degree teachers, took place in three areas; namely, collective 
bargaining structure, the financial rôle of the provincial government, and 
the supply of degree teachers. 
78 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 35. NO 1 (1980) 
First of ail, collective bargaining has shifted from a local school board 
focus, to an area focus, and then to the présent province-wide focus. Bet-
ween 1949 and 1968, salaries were determined entirely at the local level, that 
is, between the local school board and the local unit of the Saskatchewan 
Teachers' Fédération (STF) which for several décades has enjoyed, through 
législation, the équivalent of a closed-shop arrangement. In 1968 local 
bargaining was replaced by an area wide bargaining arrangement wherein 
the entire province was divided into thirteen areas for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining. The présent Teachers' Collective Bargaining Act of 1973 
replaced area bargaining by introducing the system of bi-level bargaining 
whereby salaries and certain allowances are negotiated on the provincial 
level; certain other issues being negotiated at the local level; and areas, 
which had existed as units for collective bargaining purposes only, ceased to 
exist. At the provincial level the management negotiation function is per-
formed by a joint committee which includes members appointed by the 
Department of Education of the provincial government in association with 
members appointed by the Saskatchewan School Trustées Association 
(SSTA). This latter organization has for some considérable time enjoyed 
one hundred percent membership of the school boards in the province. The 
employée interest is represented by the STF. 
This centralizing development eliminated différences in wage scales 
among the various units and city districts except for the northern areas 
which were treated as spécial cases. That is, salaries for ail teachers in the 
province are presently determined within a single scale with the resuit that 
teachers having the same qualifications and years of service receive the same 
salaries anywhere within the system except in the far northern districts as in-
dicated. It is important to note that this centralizing tendency in the 
bargaining structure has not been accompanied by comparable centraliza-
tion of overall administrative authority and functioning, either du ring the 
Area phase at the provincial level or presently on a provincial basis. That is, 
the significant administrative functions such as control of budgets, as well 
as hiring and firing of teachers, hâve remained with the local school boards. 
However, there can be documented an increasing contribution by the 
provincial government to the financing of primary and secondary éduca-
tion. In an arrangement that is probably somewhat comparable to most 
other jurisdictions in North America, financing of public schools in Saskat-
chewan has been shared between local school boards and the provincial 
government. Although the latter body has a significant supervisory respon-
sibility and operational influence, budgeting control has always remained 
the formai responsibility of local school boards. Until 1971 the amount rais-
ed by local communities in the form of property taxes always exceeded the 
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amount of operating grants by the provincial government. This relationship 
has been reversed since 1972 and as late as 1975 the amount of operating 
grants was much higher than the amount of local taxes (140 million dollars 
and 101 million dollars respectively)2. 
Another manifestation of the increasing intrusion of the provincial 
government in éducation at the local level is the change in the government's 
grants policy. Although equalization of the financial capabilities of the 
local school boards throughout the province was one of the important ob-
jectives of the government, it was not until 1971 that a more systematic ap-
proach was taken to achieve that objective. The grants formula which had 
been used prior to 1971 was rather complex. The total operating grant con-
sisted of such items as the basic per diem, the average daily attendance, the 
conveyance and the equalization grants. In other words, only a portion of 
the total grant was used for the purpose of equalization. In 1971 a new for-
mula was created after several years of study of the grant Systems of other 
provinces. This formula was much simpler in that the amount of total 
operating grant was determined to be the différence between the "recogniz-
ed" expenditure based primarily on the student enrollment and the 
"recognized" local revenues3. This formula made it much easier for the 
government to narrow geographical differentials in boards' total operating 
revenue simply by giving more grants to the board whose ability to collect 
local taxes was low. 
The third change took place in the area of teacher éducation and train-
ing. Historically, two Teachers Collèges and the Collège of Education of the 
University of Saskatchewan were the main sources of teacher supply, 
although considérable numbers of teachers were recruited from outside 
Saskatchewan. The Teacher Collèges, which specialized in training teachers 
for elementary schools, provided a basic one year course of thirty six weeks 
duration which led to the Intérim Standard Certificate. The University of-
fered a variety of courses including those leading to the Standard Certificate 
after two years of study and the Professional Certificate after four years of 
study. Also, until 1952 the University directed its efforts to the training of 
2 The Department of Education, Province of Saskatchewan, Annual Report 1975-76, 
Regina, 1976, p. 75. 
3 The recognized expenditure largely consisted of standard allowances based on a 
number of students enrolled in the school System. It also included actual payments of tuition 
fées by the school system, actual capital debt retirement, and allowances for the transportation 
of students. The recognized local revenues consisted of a computational mill rate multiplied by 
the equalized assessment of the school System, and tuition fées received from other boards, in-
dividuals, and the fédéral government. 
80 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 35. NO 1 (1980) 
teachers for highschools, after which year the Collège was authorized to 
train teachers for elementary schools4. 
In the 1950s, there was apparently a severe shortage in the supply of 
degree teachers. In 1954, for example, the number of students granted a 
B.Ed. degree from the University was 65, while as many as 110 degree 
teachers were recruited from other Canadian provinces and from abroad. 
Presumably, the supply of non-degree teachers was relatively less tight. In 
the same year, a total of 109 non-degree teachers were recruited from out-
side Saskatchewan, while the number of graduâtes from the Teachers Col-
lèges was 6345. 
To a certain extent, the Teachers Collèges depended on the University 
for the éducation of its graduâtes. The Intérim Standard Certificate issued 
after one year of training at the Teachers Collèges was a permit with a fixed 
period of validity. In order to obtain a permanent Standard Certificate, 
teachers holding the Intérim Standard Certificate had to take five Universi-
ty classes during a specified period. In July 1965 the Teachers Collèges were 
integrated into the Collège of Education, and by 1970 the Intérim Standard 
Certificate was abolished. 
The intégration of those two institutions and the subséquent abolition 
of the Intérim Standard Certificate reflect the awareness by the parties in-
volved, that is, the provincial Department of Education, the University, the 
STF, and the SSTA, of a need to upgrade the quality of teachers in the pro-
vince. Especially, the STF was known as the prime advocate of the four-
year Bachelor of Education program in the Collège of Education as a means 
of raising the status of the teaching profession. As a resuit of thèse changes, 
the supply of degree teachers increased substantially over the past two 
décades or so. During the académie year 1962-63, for example, 79 out of 
1,116 graduâtes of the Collège of Education obtained the professional cer-
tificates, while during 1973-74 as many as 408 out of 1,015 graduâtes ob-
tained the professional certificate6. 
4 For a historical development in teacher training in Saskatchewan, see Walter L. R. 
KNIGHT, Teacher Training and Certification in the Province of Saskatchewan from 
1936-1965 (unpublished M.Ed. thesis, University of Saskatchewan), Saskatoon, 1969. 
5 Figures for the number of recruits from outside Saskatchewan were obtained from 
Mr. J. S. Struthers, Chief, Teacher Services, the Department of Education. The number of 
B.Ed. degrees granted was obtained from Walter L. R. Knight, op. cit., pp. 103. The number 
of graduâtes from the Teachers Collèges was obtained from The Department of Education, 
Annual Report 1954-55, Regina, p. 65. 
6 The Department of Education, Annual Reports 1962-63, 1973-74, Regina, p. 41 and 
p. 41 respectively. 
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THE HYPOTHESES 
A review of historical changes in the institutional settings leads us to 
the testing of the following three hypothèses: 1) centralization of the 
bargaining structure might give rise to a more uniform distribution of 
degree teachers among différent school boards; 2) narrowing of 
geographical differentials in boards' ability to pay might cause narrowing 
tendency in geographical differentials in the degree teacher ratio; and 3) in-
creased supply of degree teachers might resuit in a more uniform distribu-
tion of degree teachers. 
Concerning the impact of teacher collective bargaining upon educa-
tional opportunity, Lieberman and Moskow state that local collective 
negotiations tend to intensify existing inequalities of educational opportuni-
ty. "In affluent school districts, teacher pressure may be effective in achiev-
ing greater expenditures for éducation. In poor school districts, such 
pressure will be relatively ineffective; the local school districts may simply 
not hâve the resources to meet teacher demands. Even if thèse demands are 
confined to teacher welfare, they will affect levels of educational opportuni-
ty."7 It would seem reasonable to assume that within its financial con-
straints every board attempts to hire as many degree teachers as possible un-
til it achieves some optimal degree teacher ratio, thereby providing better 
éducation for the student within its jurisdiction. Therefore, the discussion 
by Lieberman and Moskow may be interpreted as follows: If collective 
bargaining is done at the local level, affluent school districts will be able to 
offer higher salaries to degree teachers than less affluent districts. There will 
thus be created a skewed distribution of degree teachers between différent 
school districts. On the other hand, centralized bargaining would contribute 
to a more uniform distribution of degree teachers because such bargaining 
will tend to bring about a uniform salary schedule thus eliminating the 
possibility of affluent districts achieving more désirable teacher skill-mix by 
manipulating salaries for a given skill level. This is the reasoning behind the 
first hypothesis. 
The second hypothesis is based on the following reasoning: Even 
though the wage scale is standardized, it is within the jurisdiction of in-
dividual school boards to détermine the number of degree teachers to be 
hired in any given year. Degree teachers are more expensive than non-degree 
teachers. Therefore, given more or less uniform willingness to employée 
degree teachers among différent boards, financial ability to pay of in-
7 LIEBERMAN, M., and M. H. MOSKOW, Collective Bargaining for Teachers: An 
Approach to School Administration, Rand McNally and Company, Chicago, 1968. 
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dividual boards will to a great extent détermine the demand for degree 
teachers. 
As previously mentioned, financing of primary and secondary éduca-
tion is shared by the local school board and the provincial government. The 
grants policy of the provincial government is quite evidently designed to 
equalize financial capabilities as between individual school boards. This 
suggests that the geographical differentials in the degree teacher ratio may 
be largely determined by the actions of the provincial government in its at-
tempts to narrow the geographical differentials in the ability to pay of in-
dividual boards. 
The third hypothesis dépends upon the assumption that because of a 
geographical préférence on the part of the teachers, a uniform wage scale 
may not necessarily create a uniform distribution of degree teachers 
throughout the province. For example, the majority of teachers might 
prefer employment with a city rather than with a rural board, because of 
easier access to educational, cultural, and recreational opportunities that 
exist there. 
When the supply of degree teachers is limited, a large proportion of 
degree teachers may hâve the opportunity to be hired by the city boards. 
This would create a skewed distribution of degree teachers. As the supply of 
degree teachers increases, the marginal attractiveness of those teachers to 
the city boards starts to décline and not ail degree teachers will be absorbed 
into urban positions. As a resuit, there may be an overflow of degree 
teachers into the less-preferred rural districts. 
Teachers' geographical préférence might well exist not only between 
the urban and rural sectors, but also within the urban sector and within the 
rural sector. Therefore, as the supply of degree teachers becomes increas-
ingly abundant, a larger number of degree teachers might be hired by the 
less preferred boards, thereby creating a more even distribution of degree 
teachers throughout the province. 
Thèse hypothèses form the theoretical basis for the analysis of the 
determining factor(s) of the geographical differentials in the degree teacher 
ratio. Hère we will first offer the historical trends in the degree teacher ratio 
as well as the associated geographical differentials. Ail data presented in the 
subséquent sections hâve been obtained from various records kept by the 
Department of Education, Province of Saskatchewan. 
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HISTORICAL TRENDS IN GEOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENTIALS 
IN THE DEGREE TEACHER RATIO 
Data on the degree teacher ratio hâve been obtained for 65 units of 
analysis and for the 17 years between 1957 and 1964, and between 1966 and 
1974. Data for 1965 was not available. Among the 65 boards, 56 are rural 
units and 9 are city public units. There are at présent 60 rural unit boards 
and 22 city boards of which 11 are public and the remaining 11 are separate 
boards. Analysis in the study excludes 4 unit boards, 2 city public boards 
and ail city separate boards in order to maintain consistency in analysis 
because thèse boards, having corne into existence during the time span of 
the data séries used, would not therefore be represented in ail years. 
TABLE 1 
Degree Teacher Ratio and Geographical Differentials in 
Degree Teacher Ratio for 1957-64, 66-74 
Degree Teacher Ratio 
Total Unit City 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coefficient of Variation 
Total Unit City 
(4) (5) (6) 
Unit-City Dif 
(2) 
(3) x 100 
(7) 
1957 13.6 9.3 28.8 60.2 36.5 23.2 32.2 
1958 14.2 10.0 27.8 53.4 31.1 22.4 35.9 
1959 14.8 10.1 28.3 56.0 35.4 23.0 35.6 
1960 16.5 11.5 30.0 49.4 34.4 22.1 38.3 
1961 18.1 12.8 32.2 47.6 32.9 21.2 39.7 
1962 19.5 14.1 32.8 42.4 27.6 21.7 42.9 
1963 21.1 15.3 34.9 41.1 27.2 22.2 43.8 
1964 22.5 16.4 36.5 40.0 25.2 27.0 44.9 
1966 27.3 20.6 41.4 35.0 23.2 19.2 49.7 
1967 29.3 21.2 45.3 40.9 28.5 18.9 46.7 
1968 33.6 24.4 50.6 38.5 25.0 17.5 48.2 
1969 36.5 26.7 53.2 36.5 23.7 14.5 50.1 
1970 44.8 35.2 60.1 27.1 20.0 13.3 58.5 
1971 46.4 37.1 61.2 25.4 19.0 11.7 60.6 
1972 48.8 39.5 64.2 24.6 19.4 12.1 61.5 
1973 51.7 43.0 65.3 22.4 18.7 11.1 65.8 
1974 53.9 45.8 66.8 19.7 16.4 9.5 68.5 
Source: Voir original. 
Table 1 sets out historical data on the degree teacher ratio as well as 
geographical differentials thereof. The columns (1) through (3) provide the 
degree teacher ratios in the total boards, 56 rural unit boards, and 9 city 
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public boards respectively, while the columns (4) through (7) provide 
geographical differentials in the degree teacher ratios within the total 
boards, rural boards, city boards respectively as well as rural-urban dif-
ferentials. The degree teacher ratio has been calculated by dividing the total 
number of degree teachers in each group by the total number of teachers in 
the respective group. As the index of the differentials in the columns (4) 
through (6), the coefficient of variation was used which was obtained by 
dividing the standard déviation of degree teacher ratios by the mean. Thus, 
when the coefficient of variation is large, the geographical differentials are 
also large. Finally, rural-urban differentials were calculated as percentage 
ratios of the degree teacher ratio in the unit boards in the Column (2) to that 
of the city boards in the column (3). 
TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESES 
The columns (1) through (3) of Table 1 indicate that there can be iden-
tified a consistent increase in the degree teacher ratio. This trend exists not 
only within the total boards, but also within the two subgroups, the unit 
boards and the city boards. Also, it is apparent that the degree teacher ratio 
was always higher among the city than unit boards. The columns (4) 
through (7) show that in each of the four catégories differentials narrowed 
over the years and that the tendency is more or less consistent. Throughout 
the years, differentials were higher among the total boards than among the 
rural or city boards. 
Apparently, there is a strong inverse corrélation between the columns 
(1) and (4), (2) and (5), (3) and (6), and also there is a strong positive cor-
relation between the columns (1) and (7). Especially noteworthy is the 
observation that when the total degree teacher ratio suddenly increased 
from 36.5 percent to 44.8 percent between 1969 and 1970 (Column 1), there 
was a corresponding sudden decrease in the total differential index from 
36.5 percent to 27.1 percent (Column 4) and also in the unit-city differential 
index from 50.1 percent to 58.5 percent (Column 7). 
In addition, cross-sectional comparisons of the relationship between 
degree teacher ratio and the differential index among différent catégories 
also indicate the existence of the same relationship. To take the values for 
the year 1957 as a point of illustration, the degree teacher ratio is lower 
among the unit than among the city boards (9.3 percent and 28.8 percent 
respectively), while opposite is the case with the differential index (36.5 per-
cent and 23.2 percent respectively). Thèse relationships are quite stable over 
the years. 
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The négative corrélation between the degree teacher ratio and the dif-
ferential index for various catégories strongly suggest that the narrowing of 
geographical differentials in the degree teacher ratio was caused by the in-
crease in the degree teacher ratio. This observation, seems to lend strong 
support to the third hypothesis, that increased supply of degree teachers 
might resuit in a more uniform distribution of degree teachers. 
Needless to say, it is difficult to measure directly the supply of labour 
from any employment figures, because the level of employment is determin-
ed not only by supply conditions but also by the factors relating to the de-
mand for labour. Nevertheless, the following set of employment and other 
data will be useful in inferring the trend in demand-supply relationship of 
degree teachers during the period (Table 2). 
Student enrolment gradually increased between 1957 and 1969, but 
thereafter, it steadily decreased (Column 1). Since student enrolment at the 
elementary and secondary school level is the basic factor of the demand for 
teachers, the above trend indicates that the demand for teachers was in-
creasing until 1969, but it was decreasing thereafter. This is reflected on the 
total number of teachers employed which shows a consistent tendency to in-
crease until 1969 and thereafter to decrease (Column 2). Although demand 
for teachers in gênerai and for degree teachers may not be perfectly cor-
related, it is safe to infer the demand for degree teachers declined after 
1969. This observation is supported by the trend in the number of degree 
teachers (Column 3). Although the number of degree teachers steadily in-
creased over the entire period, the annual rate of increase decreased 
drastically after 1969 with the exception of 1971-1972. 
Probably the rather slow rate of increase in the earlier years is at-
tributable to the supply rather than demand factors. Column 5 shows the 
number of graduâtes with a B.Ed. degree from the University of Saskat-
chewan. Although the number of B.Ed. graduâtes increased rapidly bet-
ween 1957 and 1970 there was a consistent decreasing tendency thereafter. 
This tendency may be compared to the figures in Column 6 which shows the 
number of teachers newly hired from outside Saskatchewan. It is common 
knowledge that the board of éducation generally prefers to hire teachers 
educated in Saskatchewan to those educated elsewhere. Comparing Col-
umns 5 and 6, it is apparent that teachers educated outside Saskatchewan 
constituted a significant source of degree teacher supply in the late 50's 
through early 60's. Since mid 60's their importance has declined substantial-
ly. This can be interpreted to mean that until early 60's the demand for 
degree teachers was so strong and the supply of degree teachers from within 
Saskatchewan was sufficiently limited that the boards were forced to 
TABLE 2 
Enrolment and Number of Teachers for Various Catégories for 
1957-1974 
No. oj teachers Employed No. of Teachers 
Enrolment(l) Annual No. ofB.Ed. Recruited from 
(in thousand) Total(2) Degree Teachers(3) lncrease(4) Graduates(S) Outside Sask.(6) 
1957 191 8,107 1,123 - 84 54 
1958 195 8,284 1,198 6.6% 91 42 
1959 202 8,521 1,256 4.8% 119 38 
1960 209 8,812 1,428 13.6% 126 78 
1961 216 9,055 1,615 13.0% 245 60 
1962 224 9,469 1,797 11.2% 226 68 
1963 225 9,758 1,986 10.5% 230 85 
1964 236 10,146 2,219 11.7% 314 62 
1965 242 10,744 2,674 20.5% 396 49 
1966 246 11,235 3,078 15.1% 509 32 
1967 249 11,514 3,394 10.2% 516 43 
1968 253 11,907 4,017 18.3% 697 49 
1969 257 11,984 4,342 8.0% 771 60 
1970 257 11,013 4,468 2.9% 856 29 
1971 253 10,873 4,681 4.7% 823 51 
1972 249 10,977 5,303 13.2% 832 63 
1973 240 10,620 5,607 5.7% 798 85 
1974 231 10,566 5,790 3.2% 782 71 
Source: A. For no. of B.Ed. figures, University of Saskatchewan, Annual Report, published annually. 
B. For other statistics, Department of Education, Annual Report, published annually. 
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employ relatively large number of degree teachers from outside Saskat-
chewan. In the late 60's and thereafter, weak demand coupled with suffi-
cient supply of indigenous B.Ed. graduâtes made reliance upon out-of-
province degree teachers much less important. 
Such data seem to offer évidence in support of a conclusion that 
relative to the demand, the supply conditions of degree teachers gradually 
changed from scarcity to abundance over the period. For reasons previously 
given the increasing abundance of degree teachers helped to bring about an 
ever more even distribution of degree teachers throughout the province 
thereby causing various differential indices to narrow over the years. 
Acceptance of the third hypothesis does not necessarily mean that the 
other two hypothèses hâve been rejected because the three hypothèses may 
not be mutually exclusive. Rather, they may be supplementary one with 
another. We will examine the remaining two hypothèses, namely, the 
bargaining structure hypothesis, and the ability to pay hypothesis. 
The fact of area bargaining might, of itself, suggest that the rural-
urban differentials in the degree teacher ratio tend to narrow under area 
bargaining, because such bargaining would bring into being a single salary 
schedule for ail local boards, rural and urban, within its scope. Insofar as 
this involved increased pay scales to some school boards there would 
presumably be brought about more attractive terms of employment, at least 
to some previously lower pay scale boards. Also, area bargaining would 
make the practice of pattern bargaining much easier by reducing substan-
tially the number of bargaining relationships. Thèse two effects would tend 
to reduce not only rural-urban differentials in the degree teacher ratio, but 
also ail other kinds of differentials. 
Table 3 below provides average wages (mid-point of the scale) for Class 
4 teachers for the selected years as well as two measures of differentials 
thereof, i.e. total differentials measured by the coefficient of variation and 
rural-urban differentials where rural unit wages are shown as a percentage 
ratio of wages in city districts. Years 1958, 62 and 66 fall in the period when 
bargaining was done at the local level, while 1969 and 1972 are the years 
when the first and last area agreements were made respectively. 
As expected, area bargaining narrowed both kinds of wage differen-
tials. In terms of total differentials, the differential index decreased from 
3.1 in 1966 to 1.9 in 1969 through 0.5 in 1972. Also, relative wages in rural 
unit increased from 93.5, 97.4 and to 99.9. Those figures are consistent with 
the trends in geographical differentials in the degree teacher ratio during the 
period as observed in Table 1. It seems that area bargaining, by narrowing 
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ail kinds of geographical wage differentials, created a more even distribu-
tion of degree teachers in the province. However, changes in wage differen-
tial indices in the earlier years are not as consistent as the narrowing tenden-
cies in differential indices of the degree teacher ratio. For example, while 
total wage differentials index increased from 2.8 in 1958 to 3.1 in 1962, 
degree teacher ratio differentials decreased from 98.3 to 93.5 between 1962 
and 1966, degree teacher ratio differentials narrowed from 42.9 to 49.7. 
TABLE 3 
Average Wages for Class 4 Teachers 
A verage Wages Wage Differentials 
No. of Coefficient of Unit - City 
Scales Total Unit City Variation Differentials 
.1958 70 $4,862 4,835 4,963 2.8% 97.4% 
1962 72 5,790 5,769 5,863 3.1% 98.3% 
1966 74 7,240 7,140 7,631 3.1% 93.5% 
1969 19 8,784 8,650 8,875 1.9% 97.4% 
1972 11 10,067 10,056 10,068 0.5% 99.9% 
Data Source: Collective Bargaining Agreements 
Thus, there does not seem to be a consistently high corrélation between 
wage scales and degree teacher ratios throughout the entire period. This 
may resuit partly because the degree teacher ratio is affected not only by the 
level of wages of degree teachers, but also by wage differentials between 
degree and non-degree teachers. That is, the degree teacher ratio may not be 
high in a board that pays high wages to both degree and non-degree 
teachers, because such a board is attractive not only to degree teachers but 
also to non-degree teachers. Evidently bargaining structure, of itself, does 
not necessarily affect wage differentials between degree and non-degree 
teachers. 
The above observations suggest that although change in bargaining 
structure from local to area level created a situation that was conducive to a 
more even distribution of degree teachers, the narrowing tendency in the 
degree teacher ratio differentials prior to the introduction of area bargain-
ing cannot be explained by the nature of bargaining structure itself. The 
consistently narrowing tendency in ail kinds of differential indices 
throughout the entire period strongly suggests that more crucial influence 
has resulted from factors operating more directly within the dynamics of the 
labour market. 
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We will now turn to the examination of the "ability to pay" 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the degree teacher ratio in a given 
board is determined primarily by the board's ability to pay which, in turn, is 
significantly affected by the provincial government's "equalization" grants 
policy. 
Probably the first step should be to examine whether or not ability to 
pay of boards does in fact affect their degree teacher ratio. Based on prior 
investigation it was decided to measure ability to pay by using a per-pupil 
total operating revenue less pupil transportation costs and the purchase of 
educational services from other Systems (to be called net operating revenue). 
Thèse latter adjustments were made because such items tend not to be 
discretionary and are to some extent recognized as unique and extraor-
dinary expenses to municipalities. Thèse two items vary quite widely and 
not to deduct them would tend to overstate the "net" ability to pay of cer-
tain boards which receive considérable sums that are necessarily committed 
to thèse catégories of expenditures. 
Table 4 below shows the average net operating revenue as well as unit 
-city differentials thereof. Ability to pay of rural unit boards seems slightly 
worsened during the period, although there was an improvement between 
1970 and 1974. This trend, when compared with our earlier findings about 
unit-city differentials in the degree teacher ratio in Table 1, shows that cor-
relation is négative for 1962-1966, while it is positive for 1966-1974. This 
means that ability to pay seems to hâve affected the degree teacher ratio dif-
ferentials after 1966, but prior to that it has no positive bearings. 
TABLE 4 
Unit-City Differentials in Ability to Pay (65 Boards) 
Unit-City 
Total Unit City Differentials 
1958 NA 295 NA NA 
1962 $320 317 341 92% 
1966 419 413 459 89% 
1970 574 558 672 83% 
1974 888 867 1019 85% 
Source: Department of Education, various records. 
Turning to overall differentials, a linear simple régression équation 
with the percentage degree teachers ratio as the dépendent variable, and the 
net operating revenue as defined above as the independent variable, has 
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been estimated for cross-sectional data for five selected years. The follow-
ing Table 5 summarizes the results: 
TABLE 5 
Coefficient of Détermination (R2) for Corrélations Between 
Degree Teacher Ratio and Net Operating Revenue (65 Boards)8 
R2 F 
.10* 7.0 
.12* 8.7 
.10* 6.7 
.37** 37.2 
.44** 50.5 
* means statistical significance at the 5% test level. 
** means statistical significance at the 1% test level. 
The findings summarized in Table 5 are in gênerai agreement with our 
earlier findings about rural-urban differentials in that ability to pay has im-
portant bearings on the degree teacher ratio after late 60's Although ail R2 
values in Table 5 are statistically significant at least at the five percent test 
level, for the first three years (1958, 62, 66) the boards' ability to pay ac-
counts for only ten percent or so in the total variation in the degree teacher 
ratio, while for the latter two years (1970, 74) forty percent or so of the total 
variation is explained by the boards' ability to pay. 
As mentioned before, prior to 1968 collective bargaining was done at 
the local level. This means that it would hâve been much easier for an af-
fluent board to attract as many degree teachers as it wanted simply by offer-
ing higher salaries. In other words, we expect higher corrélation between in-
dividual boards' ability to pay and the degree teacher ratio prior to rather 
than after 1968 when the salary scales came to be determined by centralized 
bargaining bodies. In this sensé, the above findings are contrary to what is 
logically inferred from the institutional developments in the bargaining 
structure. 
Probably, this apparent puzzle may be resolved by referring back to the 
"supply push" hypothesis which was discussed before. The findings of the 
hypothesis suggest that since supply of degree teachers was limited in the 
earlier years, employment of degree teachers was determined primarily by 
geographical préférence on the part of degree teachers rather than any 
8 The définition of net operating revenue for city boards in 1958 is slightly différent 
from that which was stated earlier. 
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demand-related factor. In view of this, the rather low R2 values for 1958, 62 
and 66 are a reflection of the fact that during the period teachers were able 
to find employment with the boards which they preferred, little or no con-
straint being exercised by the board's ability to pay. 
However, increased supply of degree teachers created a situation by 
1970 wherein degree teachers could no longer détermine their employment 
on the basis of geographical préférence. The fact that the R2 value is high 
for 1970 and 1974 strongly suggests that given more or less sufficient supply 
of degree teachers, the degree teacher ratio is largely determined by the 
ability to pay of the individual board. From the above discussion, we can 
safely say that the ability to pay hypothesis and the supply push hypothesis 
are not mutually exclusive; rather they are supplementary to each other. 
We will now turn to the question of how the Provincial Government af-
fected the ability to pay of individual boards through the so-called 
"equalization" grants policy. Since boards* total operating revenue consists 
of two major items, local taxes and the Government's operating grants, the 
Government can narrow geographical differentials in boards' total 
operating revenue simply by giving more grants to the boards whose ability 
to collect local taxes is low. Also, as the amount of grants relative to the 
amount of taxes increases, the Government will corne to exert stronger in-
fluence over the total ability to pay of the individual boards. 
Table 6 summarizes some key figures to examine the above relation-
ships. In calculating simple corrélation coefficients between local taxes and 
the Government grants, two expenditure items, pupil transportation and 
payment to other Systems were deducted from the Government grants for 
the reasons given previously. The residual amounts provide the net 
operating grants. 
TABLE 6 
Corrélation Between Taxes and Net Operating Grants 
and Grants-Tax Ratio (65 Boards) 
Corrélation Between Grants-Tax 
Taxes & Net Ratio 
Year Operating Grants (*) 
1958 -.65 59.4 
1962 -.75 69.3 
1966 -.67 77.9 
1970 -.76 81.5 
1974 -.81 125.1 
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Thèse findings, summarized in Table 6, are consistent with our expec-
tations. First of ail, for ail years, corrélation between taxes and net 
operating grants is négative (Column 1), meaning that more grants were 
given to the "poor" boards, and that the magnitude has been increasing. 
Secondly, the grants-tax ratio has increased over the years. Clearly there 
seems to be an inverse relationship between Column 1 figures and figures in 
Column 2. Overall, then, it seems fair to say that the Provincial Govern-
ment, through equalization grants policy and by accepting larger financial 
responsibility, has contributed to the narrowing of the ability to pay dif-
ferentials of the local boards. This has indirectly resulted in a more uniform 
distribution of the degree teachers throughout the Province. 
SUMMARY 
This study has attempted to identify the key factors which détermine 
the distribution of the degree teachers among local boards of éducation in 
Saskatchewan. Our analysis suggests that the most important factor is the 
total supply of degree teachers. A number of studies done by us and by 
other authors hâve consistently recognized a geographical préférence 
among teachers for urban as against rural positions. In earlier years degree 
teachers in Saskatchewan, being in short supply, tended to concentrate 
toward the urban end of an urban-rural employment continuum thereby 
creating a skewed distribution. However, as the supply of the degree 
teachers increased, they became more evenly distributed because many of 
them were pushed further along the continuum away from the point of 
maximum préférence. For any particular level of degree teacher supply 
there presumably would be for each board some optimal degree/non-degree 
teacher ratio. Hence the attractiveness of additional degree teachers to 
school boards would begin to décline as the actual degree teacher ratio ap-
proached this accepted optimal ratio. 
In a condition of approximate balance between the supply and demand 
of degree teachers, the distribution of this class of teachers would tend to 
favour those school boards which hâve an advantage in respect of the ability 
to pay. That is, a board with higher ability to pay can afford to hire relative-
ly large number of degree teachers who are more expensive than non-degree 
teachers, while a "poor" board simply cannot do so. Therefore, the fact 
that geographical differentials in the degree teacher ratio has narrowed in 
récent years, reflects at least in part a narrowing tendency in the ability to 
pay of individual boards. The réduction of différences in ability to pay 
results from a grants policy on the part of the Provincial Government which 
was designed to assist in producing just that effect. 
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Although centralization of the bargaining structure created a 
favourable condition for a uniform distribution of the degree teachers by 
achieving increasingly uniform salary scales, it does not seem to hâve played 
a crucial rôle. This is so because even though salary scales are determined 
centrally, actual hiring authority is entirely in the hands of local boards, and 
it is the sum total of ail individual employment décisions that directly déter-
mines the distribution of degree teachers. 
By 1974, centralized bargaining as well as the Government's equaliza-
tion grants policy had been firmly established. Nevertheless the distribution 
of the degree teachers was far from uniform. Especially the urban-rural dif-
ferentials were still sizeable even though the trend toward a continually nar-
rowing differential was évident. 
SOME COMMENTS ON THE IMPLICATION OF THE FINDINGS 
FOR FUTURE POLICY 
This présent paper provides évidence that insofar as degree teachers are 
becoming more evenly distributed throughout the Province, this seems to be 
primarily a function of the supply factor. Hence the fact of more equal 
distribution can be understood as being a conséquence of a gênerai policy 
orientation, a manifestation of the ideology and influence of the Provincial 
Government. But the mechanism through wich more equal distribution is 
being brought about can be understood as the adoption of a particular 
strategical choice. The relationships between the actors within a System of 
économie power tend to be viewed as being adversary in central thrust 
because of the apparent inevitability that competing interests will continual-
ly surface between them. However, insofar as such power relationships can 
be viewed as closed Systems there is also the possibility of a fortuitous col-
lusiveness existing among the major actors, the conséquences of which may 
be adverse to ail interests not represented or at least not adequately 
represented within the System. For example, it would not be surprising to 
discover that of a number of avenues that were open for the achievement of 
a goal mutually desired by the actors within the System, the particular op-
tion chosen was not the least costly nor the most effective from the stand-
point of the overall community interest, but rather the one that might inflict 
a lesser cost, or pose a lesser threat to the particular interests of the major 
actors. That is, although the equalization of educational opportunity 
throughout the Province as a social objective has been given public endorsè-
ment by the government officiais, trustées, and teachers, it is possible that 
they would differ in their respective préférences as to how this goal should 
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be brought about. Hence they are motivated to find some mutually accom-
modating strategy, even though it might involve inefficient and costly 
resource allocations. 
It is possible that such décision dynamics provide an explanation for 
the particular mechanisms through which equalization of skill throughout 
the province has been taking place. It is our suggestion that the process 
through which equalization is being approached is a continuous though 
fairly graduai flooding of the market with higher qualifed candidates. This 
approach is possible because ail major actors, admittedly with unequal 
degrees of committment and enthusiasm, can support as a goal the présence 
of better qualifed teachers in every classroom and also endorse as being 
worthy, décisions of individual students of éducation to complète one or 
two additional years at university before going into the job market. This lat-
ter possibility would naturally be especially well received by the universities, 
and particularly by the two Collèges of Education. Endorsement by univer-
sities has a particular tactical utility exactly because they are not actual par-
ticipants in the collective bargaining System and yet are influential centers of 
information and attitude dissémination, and hence will predictably make 
use of opportunities to further their particular interests. Especially at the 
présent time the Saskatchewan universities are understandably anxious to 
justify récent massive expansions in physical plant, and concomitant pro-
gram and staffing expansions, since thèse institutions are faced with 
sizeable decreases in student enrolment at the primary and secondary school 
level. 
A simpler, and more direct approach to skill equalization along the 
lines of traditional staffing mechanisms would presumably hâve recom-
mended a wage System that allowed the less attractive locations to offer 
compensatory premiums in wage and non-wage components of the employ-
ment bargain as well as a system of provincial grants through which such an 
approach could be financed. Admittedly such a two-dimensional strategy 
would involve sufficient design and procédural complexities to irisk the 
charge that it would be administratively inélégant but even more to the 
point, it would conflict with the existing commitment to a single salary scale 
and also would likely raise charges of a disciminatory grants policy from the 
larger population centers. 
The skill equalization that is taking place is apparently being ac-
complished by accepting higher enrolments and graduating more teachers 
than the market can easily absorb and, at the same time, by instituting 
policies and programs which ensure that the skill-ratio of the graduating 
population is higher than the skill-ratio of the teaching population presently 
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employed. The resulting surplus of teachers will bring about an increasing 
willingness on the part of the more highly qualified job candidates to move 
into less désirable areas. Hence one would expect that there would be a 
mutually supported drive to dry up the supply of Class Two teachers who 
will be replaced by Class Three teachers; and eventually there will 
presumably be moves to dry up the supply of Class Three teachers who will 
be replaced by Class Three teachers; and eventually there will presumably 
be moves to dry up the supply of Class Three teachers who will be replaced 
by Class Four teachers. This approach would hâve the effect of bringing 
about the condition of formai equality in teacher credentials throughout ail 
the régions of the province. 
It would appear, however, that as a conséquence of this approach 
various sorts of costs would be imposed on the community. The training of 
more young people than can be absorbed in this specialized market would 
seem to create a situation in which there existed graduâtes whose educa-
tional investment could not be fully realized and who would therefore be in-
dividually penalized. The public, which foots the bill for the public éduca-
tion system on the one hand, and subsidizes in an amount of approximately 
seventy percent of the total cost of éducation at the university level on the 
other hand, would be penalized by such inefficiencies as long as the system 
continued in a condition of market imbalance. And of course there might 
occur significant costs of other sorts if unemployed graduâtes encounter 
difficulties finding appropriate alternative positions in the labour market. 
Also, since this strategy approaches the objective of wide distribution of 
skilled teachers almost as an accidential offshoot of a university level 
recruitment and training policy, the question is never asked as to whether, 
within a cost-gains context, the universal distribution of this higher level of 
skill gives the best return on the community's educational investment. It 
should also be pointed out that even under a near universal distribution of 
Class Four teachers the realities of the relative attractiveness or unattrac-
tiveness of job openings would presumably resuit in differential sélection 
based on residual personal factors such as individual compétence and en-
thusiasm. Hence, from among the higher skill classifications those who 
were judged to be 'better' would go to the preferred open positions thereby, 
at least to some extent, creating a différent sort of uneven distribution 
which would be based on personal attributes rather than formai credentials. 
To really confront the stated objective of equal distribution of skills 
government policy would necessarily hâve to identify and respond to ail the 
factors, wage and non~wage, that make up the total employment package. 
The présent rigidities entailed in a centrally-bargained single wage scale still 
allows to the local boards some room for stratégie maneuvering in respect 
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of such possible non-wage items as housing and travel subsidies, éducation 
and sabbatical leave, and other benefits that might be developed to compen-
sate for the relatively greater degree of geographical and social isolation 
which makes certain positions relatively less attractive. As yet there is no 
basis for knowing the extent to which school boards can and désire to ex-
pand and exploit the bargaining potential of thèse local issues. 
To achieve a more uniform distribution of teacher excellence, which 
would necessarily include skill level and other less formai, less tangible fac-
tors, differentials in various kinds of benefits and allowances would 
presumably hâve to be developed and supported to compensate for perceiv-
ed disadvantaged geographical and social factors. It is questionable 
whether, under the current bargaining System either provincial government 
policy or the intra-organizational power relations within the S.T.F. would 
be able to devise and then tolerate terms and conditions of employment that 
could be differentially administered so as to place the less désirable, more 
isolated units in positions of approximate equality with larger urban centers 
in the teacher market. Hence from the standpoint of the total configuration 
of factors that resuit in teaching excellence in the classroom, there is little 
reason to believe that, under présent circumstances and arrangements, the 
advantageous position of the more urbanized centers will cease to exist. 
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L'égalité des chances en éducation et la répartition 
géographique des licenciés dans l'enseignement 
en Saskatchewan 
L'pbjet de cette étude est l'examen des tendances historiques dans la répartition 
des compétences en éducation en Saskatchewan entre 1957 et 1974 à la lumière de 
certains changements dans l'organisation socio-économique entourant l'engagement 
des enseignants qui se produisit durant cette période. Après une analyse de ces 
changements, trois hypothèses ont été mises de l'avant pour expliquer la contraction 
qu'on y observa dans les écarts régionaux de la répartition des compétences en 
éducation. Ces hypothèses sont les suivantes: 1. l'hypothèse de la structure des 
négociations; 2. l'hypothèse de capacité de payer; 3. l'hypothèse de l'accroissement 
du surplus d'enseignants. 
L'hypothèse de la structure des négociations indique que, plus la structure des 
négociations devient centralisée, plus la répartition des compétences en éducation 
s'égalise quand on la compare au rapport entre l'ensemble des enseignants et le nom-
bre des enseignants licenciés. Ceci signifie que, si la négociation collective se pour-
suivait au niveau local, les commissions scolaires fortunées seraient en mesure d'of-
frir des traitements plus élevés aux enseignants que les commissions scolaires moins 
riches. Ceci créerait un partage inégal des compétences entre les différentes commis-
sions scolaires. D'autre part, la négociation centralisée au niveau provincial contri-
buerait probablement à un partage plus uniforme des enseignants licenciés parce 
qu'une telle négociation entraînerait une échelle uniforme des salaires, ce qui aurait 
pour effet de limiter la possibilité pour les commissions scolaires fortunées d'ac-
quérir un personnel enseignant plus qualifié en établissant et en offrant des taux de 
salaires particulièrement attrayants. 
La capacité de payer se fonde sur les motifs suivants. Même si les échelles de 
salaires sont normalisées, il est du ressort des commissions scolaires prises in-
dividuellement de fixer le nombre d'enseignants licenciés qu'on peut engager pour 
une année donnée. Les enseignants licenciés touchent un traitement substantielle-
ment plus élevé que les non-licenciés. En conséquence, étant donné l'empressement 
plus ou moins uniforme des diverses commissions scolaires à engager des enseignants 
licenciés, la capacité de payer des commissions scolaires prises individuellement 
déterminera dans une large mesure la demande d'enseignants licenciés, d'où l'obser-
vation d'une tendance au resserrement des écarts régionaux dans la répartition des 
compétences en éducation, ce qui peut être tout simplement la reflexivité d'écarts qui 
se rétrécissent dans la capacité de payer des commissions scolaires. 
La troisième hypothèse indique qu'une augmentation de l'offre chez les 
enseignants licenciés tend à établir une répartition plus égale des enseignants licenciés 
entre les différentes commissions scolaires. Cette hypothèse confirme qu'une échelle 
uniforme des salaires ne se traduit pas nécessairement par une répartition uniforme 
des enseignants licenciés dans toute la province à cause de l'existence d'une 
préférence régionale qui s'exprime dans un choix favorisant les commissions 
scolaires urbaines au détriment des commissions scolaires rurales. Cette constatation 
fait ressortir que, lorsque l'offre d'enseignants licenciés est limitée, tous les 
enseignants licenciés, s'ils le désirent, peuvent être engagés par les commissions 
scolaires qu'ils préfèrent, créant ainsi une répartition faussée des enseignants licen-
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ciés. Lorsque l'offre d'enseignants licenciés s'accroît, l'attirance marginale vers les 
commissions scolaires qu'ils préféraient antérieurement commence à décliner, d'où il 
peut y avoir un excédent d'enseignants licenciés dans les régions moins recherchées, 
ce qui crée une répartition plus égale. 
Ces trois hypothèses furent vérifiées en regard d'un ensemble de séries 
chronologiques tirées de différents registres conservés au ministère de l'Éducation de 
la Saskatchewan. Ces recherches laissent sous-entendre que l'hypothèse de l'augmen-
tation du surplus d'enseignants fournit l'explication la plus satisfaisante, quoique les 
données pour les dernières années favorisent l'hypothèse de la capacité de payer. 
D'autre part, l'analyse empirique n'apporte pas un appui très fort à l'hypothèse de la 
structure des négociations. Une structure de négociations de plus en plus centralisée, 
tout en étant efficace en ce qui a trait à la normalisation des échelles de salaires, ne 
semble pas être d'un poids très important sur l'égalisation du partage des com-
pétences dans le secteur de l'éducation. 
Pour ce qui est de 1974, la répartition des enseignants licenciés était loin d'être 
uniforme. Les écarts entre le milieu urbain et le milieu rural étaient encore très mar-
qués. Afin d'en arriver à une répartition plus uniforme des compétences en éduca-
tion, on peut concevoir deux possibilités: 1. continuer à accroître l'offre d'ensei-
gnants licenciés, même au point de créer un surplus; 2. imaginer un système de com-
pensation par lequel les facteurs géographiques désavantageux qu'on perçoit soient 
corrigés en offrant plus d'avantages et d'allocations. Bien que cette dernière mesure 
soit probablement la plus désirable du point de vue d'une allocation efficace des 
ressources et que, en conséquence, elle en minimise le coût pour la collectivité, il est 
douteux que les principaux acteurs du système de négociations collectives, le 
ministère de l'Éducation, l'Association des commissaires d'écoles de la Saskat-
chewan et la Fédération des enseignants de la Saskatchewan, soient prêts et en 
mesure d'inventer et, ensuite, de supporter un tel système d'écarts dans les salaires 
parce que l'uniformité des échelles de salaires à la grandeur de la province a été 
retenue comme la priorité fondamentale de la part de la Fédération des enseignants 
et qu'elle offre aussi un avantage politique considérable au gouvernement de la 
Saskatchewan. 
